Against omas Mormann's argument that di erential topology does not support Carnap's conventionalism in geometry we show their compatibility. However, Mormann's emphasis on the entanglement that characterizes topology and its associated metrics is not misplaced. It poses questions about limits of empirical inquiry. For Carnap, to pose a question is to give a statement with the task of deciding its truth. Mormann's point forces us to introduce more clarity to what it means to specify the task that decides between competing hypotheses and in what way such a task may be both in practice and/or in principle impossible to carry out.
Introduction
ere are, possibly among others, three lines of attack against Rudolf Carnap's conventionalism in geometry. We will give a brief summary what their respective targets are and then focus on one of them to substantiate our claim that, whatever else may be said about Carnap's conventionalism in geometry, it does not run afoul of mathematical topology.
Instead, the objections reveal that there is an obscurity at the heart of Carnap's account of scienti c objectivity with respect to the practical limitations an empirical inquirer faces. Empiricists sometimes reject the idea that there are areas of the world inaccessible to empirical investigation. Carnap is less clear. On the one hand, he rejects Emil Heinrich Du Bois-Reymond's ignorabimus, 'I shall not know.' A well-posed question is capable of an answer. On the other hand, Carnap's account explicitly suggests the existence of at least singularities of principled ignorance.
Conventionalism comes in two varieties (see chapter 1 in Ben-Menahem, 2006), both of which are strongly supported by Carnap. e rst variety highlights the underdetermination of theory. ere are two types of underdetermination of theory. Reichenbach's weak version claims that a restricted body of evidence (for example, restricted with respect to time, i.e. past observations) will allow empirically equivalent but mutually incompatible theories to imply the totality of observations. Quine's strong version claims that unrestricted evidence (all observations, either past and future or all possible observations) is compatible with empirically equivalent but mutually incompatible theoretical alternatives. e second variety is necessary truth conventionalism. Necessary truth (before Kripke, 1980 , largely associated with a priori truth) cannot be refuted by experience because it does not make any assertions about the empirical world. It merely "records our determination to use words in a certain fashion" (Ayer, 1946, 84) . In e Logical Syntax of Language, for example, Carnap seeks to show that logical and mathematical truths are grounded in linguistic convention. For an account of how conventionalism is compatible with Kripke's version of necessary truth see Sidelle, 1989 .
e speci c form of conventionalism in geometry that Carnap inherits from Poincaré is the platform from which, often by analogy, he launches into conventionalism in other areas. Consider, for example, Carnap's comment in Der Raum where the transformation of a statement from one metric into another is "aptly compared" (Carnap, 1978, 99) to the translation of a proposition from one language into another. Conventionalism in geometry serves as evidence that not only are we able to express topological facts using various metrics, but we are also able to express the meaning of a sentence using various languages. Linguistic descriptions and their underlying propositional contents are in a many-to-one relationship. Formally, there is no privilege for certain descriptions over others, and as long as they are unambiguous they are of equal rank in expressing their associated propositions (they can be di erentiated by informal or pragmatic criteria such as simplicity). Conventionalism in geometry, although it is not referred to, in uences the formation of the principle of tolerance in e Logical Syntax of Language (Carnap, 1937, 52 ) (see Mormann, 2007, 51) .
Conventionalism is not an incidental feature of Carnap's philosophical projects, for instance in the e Logical Structure of the World (from now on Aufbau) . e Aufbau not only pursues the reduction that subsequently was recognized to have failed both by Carnap himself as well as his critics (see Quine, 1951, 37f; Richardson, 1998, 13) . A larger project behind the reduction of science to logical form on the basis of elementary experiences is "the most fundamental aim of the Aufbau: namely, the articulation and
